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TOON TOWN: DO CARTOON
CROSSOVERS MERIT FAIR USE
PROTECTION?
In 1989, after retiring his popular daily comic strip Bloom County,
cartoonist Berkeley Breathed launched a new weekly cartoon known
as Outland.' One of the starring characters was Mortimer Mouse, a
"moth-eaten mouse with [a] 5 o'clock shadow . . . droopy red drawers
. . . clutching what looks like a martini . . . smoking a cigarette [and]
definitely . . . in need of a shave." 2 Mortimer, an obviously disreputa-
ble-looking lampoon of Mickey Mouse, is the name Walt Disney origi-
nally intended for the rodent star.' Upon reading the strip, Walt Disney
Company chairman Michael Eisner sent Breathed a letter asking him
to drop the Mortimer character. 4 Breathed, however, refused the re-
quest.' Disney, known for its vociferous attacks on copyright infringers,
allegedly threatened the cartoonist with a lawsuit.' Breathed, never one
to shy away from criticism, incorporated the lawsuit into the strip itself
by having the character Opus the penguin declare, "As the Walt Disney
Co. is threatening to sue us over the unauthorized use of Mickey
Mouse, we thought we might . . . er . . set things straight." 7
 The
episode then goes on to depict the Mortimer Mouse story, where a
1 See Yardena Arar, A Martini-Swilling Mouse Draws Only Murmurs from Disney, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 13, 1989, at 31).
2 Id.; see BERKELEY BREATHED, POLITICALLY, FASHIONARLY, AND AERODYNAMICALLY INCOR-
RECT 8 (1992).
3 See Arar, supra note 1, at 3D.
4
 See Disney Chairman Eisner Asks Breathed to Delete Comic Strip Character; Copyright Infringe-
ment, ENT . LrrlG. REP., Jan. 8, 1990, at 32 thereinafter Eisner].
5 See id.
6
 See BREATHED, supra note 2, at 8; Paul Richter, Disneys Tough Meths, L. A. Timm, July 8,
1990, at DI. Nearly one-quarter of the 800 lawsuits and regulatory actions Disney pursues each
year are over copyright and trademark actions. See Richter, supra at DI. One example of Disney's
active campaign to protect its copyrights is a suit against three day-care centers in Florida that
had adorned their outside walls with paintings of Disney characters. See id. The matter was
resolved when rival Universal Studios painted the Flintstones cartoon characters over the Disney
illustrations and threw a party for the children. See id. Another example is Disney's 1989 suit
against the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences over an actress's depiction of a
simpering Snow White at the opening of the Oscar ceremony. See id. After the New York Times
editorialized that Disney should be given the "Can't 'rake a joke" award, Carry Trudeau drew a
cartoon in which a trembling Snow White, in a clandestine midnight interview, complains about
Disney's treaunent of her—the interview ends suddenly when a Disney lawyer arrives to take her
away, singing "Eli ho, hi ho, it's off to court we go!" Id.
7 BREATHED, supra note 2, at 8.
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fledgling Walt Disney in 1928 hires fraternal twin brothers Mortimer
and Mickey Mouse, using Mortimer as Mickey's unbilled stunt double
until he enlists in the army.' The strip also parodies the Disney studio's
transformation under Michael Eisner from a magical kingdom into a
corporate conglomerate concerned only with making money.° Return-
ing home after forty-five years in Europe, long-lost Mortimer attempts
to rectify Eisner's obsession with finances, but instead ends up ban-
ished to Outland, the "place everyone goes who doesn't fit in."'° The
episode concludes with Opus stating, "Boy! What a lovely story! I
certainly don't see any reason for Disney, Inc. to sue little or us, do
you . . . ?"" In weaving this parody, Breathed drew—and drew upon—
such notable Disney characters as Mickey Mouse, Snow White, Dopey
and Bambi.' 2
Breathed is not the only cartoonist to appropriate someone else's
characters." In a recent Zippy Sunday strip, Bill Griffith parodied both
the narrowing readership of comic strips and modern big-business
"Mergermania" by combining twelve different comic strip characters
into one unified strip under the dominion of Disney." To illustrate this,
Griffith placed Mickey Mouse ears on the heads of the different char-
acters, and then drew those heads onto the bodies of his Zippy char-
acters.' 5
 Cartoonists have been doing these "crossovers" (where one
cartoon strip uses another cartoonist's characters) since 1907 in an
attempt to create the appearance of "a comic strip world, a kind of
'toon town where the characters live together and get to know each
other after hours."' But what the cartoonists may not always realize is
that every time they draw someone else's characters, unless the affir-
" See id.
" See id. at 8-9.
I° Id. at 9. When Mortimer returns to the Disney studios, he finds his brother Mickey chained
in the animation dungeon, being forced to draw the next Roger Rabbit cartoon and claiming,
"Oh, Mort! Everything's CHANGED! . . . Walt's Gone! The magic's over! THE GUY FROM
ACCOUNTING is running the place! Morals are slipping, Mort ... He's introduced new cartoon
characters! . . . WOMEN characters! ...WITH PRONOUNCED BOSOMS!!" Id. Mortified upon
hearing this, Mortimer hunts down and engages "top Motisketeer" Eisner in "a most un-Disneylike
brouhaha," but ultimately ends up leaving town armed only with two suitcases and Michael
Eisner's teeth marks in his right ear. Id.
" Id.
12 See BRKATiwn, .supra note 2, at 8-9.
13 See, e.g., Bill Griffith, zipm, Bos•oN Gi.om, Nov. 12,1995, Comics.
14 See id. ("Mergermania!! 12 strips in onel! It's the American Way!!").
15 See id. The various characters used were: Mike Doonesbury from Doonesbury, Charlie
Brown from Peanuts, Dag-wood Btimstead from Blondie, Dilbert, Superman, Nancy, Cathy, Popeye,
Garfield, Calvin from Calvin &' Hobbes, and Billy from Family Cirrus. See id.
'" David Astor, An Ohio State Talk for 'Zippy' Creator; Bill Griffith Discusses His Comic Strip at
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illative defense of "fair use" applies, they are infringing upon a feder-
ally protected copyright."
This note explores the legal ramifications of cartoon crossovers to
determine whether such use is allowed under modern copyright prin-
ciples. Part I establishes the foundation of the law of copyright protec-
tion. Part II introduces the fair use affirmative defense to copyright
infringement, including the United States Supreme Court's most re-
cent analysis in Campbell u Acuff-Rose Music, /nc.' 8 Part III is a study of
various copyright infringement cases involving cartoons. Part IV ana-
lyzes cartoon crossovers under the fair use affirmative defense in light
of Campbell, concluding that crossovers are indeed a fair use of another
cartoonist's protected characters.
I. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries  " 1 " James Madi-
son, discussing the Constitution in the Federalist Papers, noted that
this power will "scarcely be questioned," and common law recognizes
the right of authors to copyright their work. 2° In light of this common-
law right to protect one's creation, Congress enacted the initial copy-
right statute in 1790 to stimulate artistic creativity for the public benefit
while providing the artist with the financial motivation for creativity
that flows from a limited form of monopoly. 2 '
To establish an action for infringement of a protected copyright,
a plaintiff must show both ownership of that copyright and that the
defendant copied the protected material without authorization. 22 Own-
ership is shown by proof of originality, copyrightability and compliance
with the applicable statutory prodedures. 2" Thus, a plaintiff who has
registered a work with the United States Copyright Office can easily
a Festival that also Features Remarks by a Cartooning Author, Erwrcm & PUBLISHER, Sept. 16, 1995,
at 40.
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
18
 510 U.S. 569 (1994),
IS U.S. CONST. ari. I, § 8, el. 8,
° THE FEDERAL/ST No. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rosslier ed., 1961).
21 See Campbell v. Acta-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981); Pillsbury v. Milky Way Prod., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1(116, 1023
(NJ). Ga. 1981).
22 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cu. 1992).
23 SeeApple Barrel Prod, Inc. v. Beard, 730 E2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1989). Federal law requires
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demonstrate ownership because a certificate of registration constitutes
prima facie evidence of ownership. 24
 Full registration itself is not nec-
essary to prove ownership, however, as one need only establish pay-
ment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question and receipt
by the Copyright Office of a registration application. 25 Once ownership
of the copyright is shown, the plaintiff can then demonstrate that the
defendant copied the work in one of two ways: (1) direct evidence; or
(2) circumstantial evidence, consisting of both access to the copy-
righted work and substantial similarity between the copyrighted work
and the defendant's work. 26 One example of direct evidence could be
in the form of the defendant's explicit admission that he copied the
plaintiff's work.27
 Another example of direct evidence would be a wit-
ness who observed the defendant engaging in the physical act of copy-
ing.28
 Circumstantial evidence, however, is the more common form of
proof Substantial similarity does not require literal identical copying
of every detail. 3° Rather, similarity is determined by the "ordinary
observer" test: whether an average observer (i.e., a layman) would
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
protected work.'t An example of circumstantial evidence would arise
where the defendant, after seeing the plaintiff's work on television,
creates a work that is substantially similar to the plaintiff's work, thus
leading an ordinary observer to recall the plaintiff's work."
registration of the copyright with the Copyright Office before any action for infringement can
he made. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1994).
24 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(a)-(b), 410(c) (1994). Under § 408(a), registration of a copyright in
any work, whether published or unpublished, can be made by 'the owner of copyright" at any
time. Id. § 408(a). The claim may be registered in the Copyright Office by depositing copies of
the work together with an application and fee. See id. § 408(h). Under § 410(c), the certificate
of registration constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright . ." Id. § 410(c).
25 See Apple Barrel, 730 F.2d at 386-87.
26 See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981); Sid
& Marty Kraft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
Substantial similarity is determined by whether an average observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307.
27 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters,, 471 U.S. 539. 548 (1985) (noting that
editors of The Nation magazine admitted to copying verbatim 300-40(} words from President
Gerald Ford's unpublished memoirs); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307 (noting that defendant admitted
to giving explicit instructions that plaintiffs work he copied).
28 See CRAIG JOYCE VI' AL., CovviaGHT LAw § 8.03, at 692 (3d ed. 1994).
29 See id.
5(1 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307.
51 „rd.
52 See Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 517 F. Stipp. 1202, 1204, 1207 (N.1). Tex.
1981). Sambo's restaurant had access to Dr. Pepper's commercials by obtaining and viewing
copies of the "Be a Pepper" campaign. Id. Sambo's then created their own "Dancing Seniors"
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In addition, section 106 of the Copyright Statute provides repro-
duction protection for the copyright owner, giving the owner exclusive
rights to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies and to prepare
derivative works based upon the original." The law defines a derivative
work as a recasting, transformation or adaptation of the original.'"
Copyright protection is not absolute, however." The most common
means of avoiding liability for infringement lie in the fair use affirma-
tive defense." This equitable doctrine permits others to use copy-
righted material without the owner's consent in a reasonable manner
for certain purposes. 37
II. TI-u FAIR USE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of fair use carves out a limited exception to the
broad rights granted copyright owners by allowing others to make
reasonable use of protected works without permission.'" The purpose
of fair use is to balance the need to provide individuals with sufficient
incentives to create public works against the public's interest in the
dissemination of information." Fair use constitutes an affirmative de-
fense to copyright infringement. 4" The doctrine developed over time
in the case law until Congress codified it in 1976. 41 Once the copyright
commercial that was substantially similar to Dr. Pepper's commercial because is combination of
Sambo's lyrics and music, along with its tag line "Don't you want to be a Senior, too?" would lead
an ordinary observer to recall the plaintiff's "Be a PeppeC ,jingle tag line. Id.
33 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)—(2) (1994).
34
 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A derivative work is defined as:
[a work] based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation ..
fictionalization ... art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any tither form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Id.
3
 See JoycE, .supra note 28, at 779.
sfiSee id.
37 See Rogers, 960 F.2c1 at 308.
3B See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House,
Inc., 36(1 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966). Because die financial reward guaranteed to the copyright
holder is "but an incident of [the] general objective [of copyright law], rather than an end in
itself . courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate
the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in
the development of art, science and industry." Berlin E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541,
543-44 (2d Cir. 1964).
3!1
	 Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986).
4f)
 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591) (1994).
Srl? 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); Campbell 510 U.S. at 576.
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owner establishes a prima facie case of infringement, the alleged in-
fringer may invoke the defense. 42 In determining whether a particular
use is fair, a court weighs four enumerated factors: (1) the purpose
and character of the use; (2) the nature of the original; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the protected work that is used; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the market for the original work."' After analyzing all
four factors together, if the court determines that the overall balance
weighs in favor of fair use, then there is no infringement of the
copyright with respect to such use." In other words, the court allows
limited use of copyrighted works without permission. 45
The qualitative framework for what later came to be known as the
four factors of the fair use affirmative defense was established in 1841,
in Folsom u. Marsh, where Justice Story of the Circuit Court of Massa-
chusetts held that the defendant infringed the copyright of the plaintiff
when he copied, verbatim, 353 pages from the plaintiffs book.'" Both
the defendant and the plaintiff were publishers of books on George
Washington's correspondence."' The court reasoned that the essential
value of the defendant's work came from Washington's letters—letters
whose copyright belonged exclusively to the plaintiff—and that to
allow unlimited copying would destroy the plaintiffs copyright."' In-
cluded in the court's decision was the fact that the plaintiff copied
entire letters, rather than abbreviated or select passages."' Because the
court determined that these letters constituted the most interest and
value to the public, the court stated that copying the letters in their
entirety was a clear invasion of plaintiffs property right. 50 The court
noted in dicta that the defendant would have escaped infringement
had he published only an abridgment of plaintiff's work.5 ' In its deci-
sion, the court set forth a test for whether a subsequent use of copy-
rightable material is a "justifiable use" of the original materials, thus
42 See 3 MEllxii.i.E.: I3. NINIM RR & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (MB) §§ 13.01, 13.05
(June 1995).
' 13 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78; Twin Peaks Prod. v. Publications Ina 996 F.2d 1366,
1373-74 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1993).
44 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 116, 433 (1984); see also Campbell,
510 U.S. at 577-78.
45 See Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 306.
46 FOIS0111 v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 349 (C.C.D. Mass, 1841) (No. 4901).
47 See id. at 343.
48 See id. at 349.
49 See id.
5° See id.
rl See &Awn, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
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constituting no infringement of plaintiff's work. 52
 The factors the court
included in this test were "the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work."" The court determined
that the defendant failed this inchoate fair use test because he copied
much of plaintiff's work in its entirety, rather than taking only abbre-
viated passages. 64 The court thus held that excessive copying of an-
other's work constituted copyright infringement. 55
Twentieth century cases sharpened several aspects of the fair use
doctrine, including a determined attempt to express the rationale of
the privilege in terms of the policies embedded in the Copyright
Clause." In 1964, in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a humor magazine's
publication of satiric parody lyrics was not a copyright infringement. 67
The owners of twenty-five popular songs instituted an action against
Mad Magazine alleging that Mad's substitution of parody lyrics for
some of the original words constituted infringement of the copyrighted
pieces." The court noted that only the words were satirized; the maga-
zine did not reproduce the music in any form whatsoever.'` The court
weighed the common law fair use factors and found that Mad's use of
the lyrics had no intent or effect of fulfilling the demand for the
original, nor did Mad appropriate a greater amount of the original
than was necessary to conjure up the object of its satire.° In fact, noted
the court, the disparities in theme, content and style between the
original and the alleged infringer could hardly be greater. ['' In its
52 Id. at 348. The term "fair use" was established in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Gas. 26, 61 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
53
 FOLSOM, 9 F. Cas. at 348,
54 Id. at 349.
sr, Id.
56 See JoycE, supra note 28, at 787.
57 529 F.2d 541, 542, 545 (2d Cir. 1964). The term "fair use" was nut always used before the
1976 codification of the doctrine. See id.
58 See id. at 542-43. Two examples of Mar's parodies included: (1) rewriting the nostalgic
ballad "The Last Time I Saw Paris" into '"The First Time I Saw Mafis," a caustic C01111)1C/Itary upon
the tendency of baseball heroes to become television advertising pitchmen; and (2) transforming
the tribute to leminine beauty "A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody" into "Louella Schwartz Describes
Her Malady," a burlesque of a leminine hypochondriac troubled with sleeplessness and a propen-
sity to tell the world of her plight. Id. at 543.
•'6 See id. at 542.
60 See id. at 545.
"I See id.
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analysis, the court articulated copyright policy and reasoned that the
copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return must some-
times defer to the greater public interest in the development of art,
science and industry. 62 Thus, the court held that Mad's use of the
plaintiff's popular songs did not constitute infringement of the pro-
tected originals. 63
After a long and detailed common law tradition, Congress codi-
fied the fair use defense in section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976."
In so doing, Congress sought to preserve the doctrine's common law
character while leaving courts free to adapt it on a case by case basis." 5
The statutory framework, mirroring Justice Story's language in Folsom,
creates a four part balancing test for a court to engage in to determine
whether the fair use defense will be allowed. 66
 The court must look to:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use
is for commercial or nonprofit purposes; (2) the nature of the original;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the original work used; and (4)
the effect of the use on the potential market for the original.67 These
four factors are an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list whose factors
the court should balance to determine whether the public interest in
the free flow of information outweighs the copyright holder's interest
in exclusive control over the work.68
 In other words, rather than creat-
ing a general definition of fair use, Congress decided that courts must
analyze each case on its own facts using the four stated criteria as a
gauge, and that courts are free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations as they see fit.''`' Two cases typifying fair use jurisprudence
are the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Harper & Row, Publishers,
62 See Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544.
63 See id. at 545.
64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
65 See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435; HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2043 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669, 5678.
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Folsom, 9 E Cas. at 348; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-77.
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The relevant statutory language states:
[Tihe fair use of a copyrighted work .. for purposes such as criticism [or]
comment ... is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include: ( I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
68 See Rogers, 960 F.2(1 at 308; Hustler, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1153; see also H.R. R•. No.
1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680.
69 H.R. REP. No. 1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. As an example of the illustrative
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Inc. v. Nation Enterprises and the Second Circuit's 1993 decision in Twin
Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd.'"
In 1985, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the
United States Supreme Court held that a magazine's use of verbatim
excerpts from an unpublished manuscript was not entitled to the
fair use defense. 71 Former President Gerald Ford gave Harper & Row
Publishers, ("Harper & Row"), exclusive rights to publish his as yet
unwritten memoirs." Harper & Row contracted with Time magazine
to print excerpts from the manuscript one week before shipment of
the full' length hook to bookstores." Two weeks before the Time article
was scheduled for release, The Nation magazine secretly procured a
copy of the manuscript and published excerpts, effectively "scooping"
Time."' As a result, Time canceled its piece and refused to pay Harper
& Row." Harper & Row brought suit for copyright violation against The
Nation magazine."'
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that in quoting
verbatim from Ford's original manuscript, The Nation effectively gave
itself the right of first publication, an important and marketable right
owned by Harper & Row. 77 Upon establishing that The Nation had
infringed. Harper & Row's copyright, the Court proceeded to analyze
whether or not The Nation's action merited a fair use defense." In its
analysis of the first factor, purpose and character, the Court stated that
a commercial use weighs against a fair use defense." Thus, in evaluat-
ing The Nation's intended purpose of scooping the copyright holder's
nature of these factors, in 1984, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia stated in DC Comics Inc. V. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc: that:
In addition to the limr factors necessarily considered in a determination of fair
use, the Court considers a fifth factor. There is a dillerence between works that
incidentally parody other works while creating a genuinely distinct product and
those that comprise little more than an adaptation of another's original
work... .Trading upon the imagination and originality of another is not I:tir use.
598 E Stipp. 110,1 l9 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that singing telegrams infringed upon Superman
and Wonder Woman characters).
7° Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc. v. Publications Intl, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
71 471 U.S, at 569.
72 See id. at 542.
73 See id. at 542-43.
71 See id. at 543.
75
 See id.
71 See.Harper & /?ow, 471 U.S. at 543.
77 See id. at 549.
7M See id.
79 See id. at 562.
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right of first publication, the Court decided that the first statutory
factor weighed against a finding of fair use."
The Court next decided that the second statutory factor, the
nature of the copyrighted work, also weighed against a fair use defense
because The Nation did not just copy unprotectable facts, but copied
the most expressive and protectable elements of Ford's work. 8 ' In its
analysis of the amount and substantiality of the portion used, the Court
also found that this third factor weighed against fair use because,
although The Nation quantitatively only copied an insubstantial portion
of Ford's book, the actual qualitative content of what was copied was
the "heart" of the book, 82 Finally, in analyzing the effect on the market,
the Court first stated that this last factor is undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use." The Court then found that this fourth
factor analysis weighed against fair use since Time's refusal to pay
Harper & Row constituted clear-cut evidence of actual damage. 84 Thus,
the Supreme Court held that The Nation's use of verbatim transcripts
from Ford's unpublished manuscript did not warrant the fair use
defense. 85
In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
book containing a detailed summary of television show plots was not
fair use of the teleplays (scripts). 86 Twin Peaks Productions, ("Twin
Peaks"), brought a copyright infringement action against Publications
International, Ltd., ("PM"), for publishing a book detailing, among
other things, the plot, characters, actors and episodes of the "Twin
Peaks" television show. 87 The Second Circuit began its analysis by stat-
ing that in a prima facie case of copyright liability, the copyright owner
must prove ownership and copying of constituent elements of the
work."
First, the court established that Twin Peaks had proven ownership
of its teleplays and televised episodes through registration with the
Copyright Office. 89
 Next, the court concluded that Twin Peaks had
established copying of its protected works through circumstantial evi-
HI) See id.
81 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64.
82 Id. at 564-65.
KS See id. at. 566.
44 See id. at 567.
85 See id. at 569.
86 996 F.2d 1366,1378 (2d Cir. MI).
87 See id. at 1370.
88 See id. at 1371-72.
88 See id. at 1371. Initially, there was sonic confusion as to whether Twin Peaks established
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dence of both access and substantial similarity." The court noted that
PIL had access to the protected works because the ability to watch the
televised programs served as the functional equivalent of access to the
protectable content of the teleplays." The court then concluded that
substantial similarity between the two works existed because two chap-
ters of the book consisted of extensive direct quotations from the
teleplays as well as a direct recounting of the first eight episodes. 92 The
court noted that the concept of similarity embraces not only global
similarity in structure and sequence, but also localized similarity in
language.93 Thus, after establishing a prima facie case of copyright
infringement, the court next went on to determine whether to allow
PIL the fair use defense."
The court first established that PIL's book is a work of "comment"
and perhaps "criticism," thus satisfying two of section 107's list of
purposes for which a claim of fair use may be made. 95 The court next
made plain that its decision would ultimately turn on whether or not
PIL's book borrowed the protected expression of Twin Peak's original
for purposes that advance the policies of copyright law."" To make this
determination, the court applied the four factor balancing test.°
As to purpose and character of the use, the court concluded that
this first factor weighed in favor of infringement." The court reasoned
that PIL's book was merely a detailed report of the Twin Peaks plots
that goes far beyond merely identifying their basic outline for the
transformative purposes of comment or criticism." Next, the court
decided that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
also weighed in favor of infringement because the television program
ownership of the teleplays only or of both the teleplays and the televised episodes. See id. The
court stated, however, that its disposition of the copyright issues was unaffected either way. See id.
'"' See id. at 1372-73.
91 See Tiffin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1372.
92 See id. at 1372-73.
93 See id, at 1372. 'the court also held that PIL's hook constituted a derivative work based
upon Twin Peaks' protected product, and thus constituted infringement since the copyright
owner also owns the right to make derivative works. See id. at 1373. The court noted, however,
that this determination that the hook was a derivative work was superfluous to establishing a
prima facie case of infringement. See id, at 1372.
94 See id. at 1373.
° Id. at 1374.
E"' See Twin Peaks, 996 1 ,9.2d at 1374.
See id. at 1374-77.
98 See id. at 1376.
w See id. at 1375. The official name liar a work that gives a detailed plot summary is an
"abridgement." Id. The Copyright Act recognizes abridgements as a form of a derivative work
and gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to prepare such derivative works. 17 U.S.C.
101, 106(2).
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was not a work consisting of uncopyrightable facts, but a creative,
fictional work deserving wide protection.""'
Third, the court focused on the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.'w The
court noted that the third prong is redundant, since establishing a
prima facie case of infringement included a determination that PIL's
book was substantially similar to the show. 1 "2
 Thus, the court held that
this factor also weighed in favor of infringement because the book
lifted many parts verbatim from the script.'"
Finally, the court analyzed the effect of the use upon the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.m4 The court noted that
this fourth factor favors fair use when the defendant's work fills a
market niche that the plaintiff simply has no interest in occupying.'m
In this case, however, the court reasoned that P1L's book could inter-
fere with Twin Peaks' primary existing market because it is possible
that a person who had missed an episode of the show would find the
book an adequate substitute for renting the videotape of that epi-
sode.'" Part of the court's analysis of infringement on the potential
market included the fact that Twin Peaks had already licensed two
books and was planning to license more.'° 7 In the end, the court
concluded that although Twin Peaks could not bar publication of
works of comment, criticism or news reporting on the show, it may
rightfully claim infringement with respect to a book that reports the
plot in such extroardinary detail.'" Thus, the Second Circuit held that
PIL's book was not entitled to the fair use defense. 109
The Supreme Court modified long established fair use dogma in
1994, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., holding that a rap parody
of a ballad constituted fair use."' In Campbell, the owners of Roy
Orbison's rock ballad "Oh, Pretty Woman" brought suit after the rap
"See TWin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1376.
l'" See id.
"See a at 1377.
L" See id. at 1376-77.
IC" See id. at 1377.
"See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1377. The court stated that because copyright holders rarely
write parodies of their own works, write reviews of them, or write new analyses from an opposite
political perspective, these would be situations where the fourth factor would favor fair use. See
irL
11Ni
 See id.
1°7 See id.
" See id.
" See id. at 1378.
'510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994).
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group 2 Live Crew parodied the song.'" The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judg-
ment for 2 Live Crew after performing a fair use analysis and finding
that the parody made fair use of Orbison's original.' 12 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, however, holding that the bla-
tant commercial purpose of the parody rendered it a presumptively
unfair use." 5 The Supreme Court, in granting certiorari to determine
whether 2 Live Crew's commercial parody could be fair use, proceeded
to alter the interpretation of the four statutory factors.'"
Although it is not explicitly listed in the preamble to section 107,
the Court first held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may
claim fair use protection."' The Court went on to re-analyze the first
statutory factor, purpose and character of the use, including whether
the use is for commercial or non-profit purposes."" The Court held
that a finding of commercial purposes is not presumptively unfair, but
rather only one element of the analysis, the force of which varies with
the context."' Thus, the Court concluded that commerciality may
weigh against the infringer, but is not by itself conclusive." 8 The Court
noted that the crux of this first factor is to determine the transformative
nature of the new work—i.e., whether the new work added something
novel, with a further purpose or different character, or altered the
original with new expression, meaning, or message."'' To the extent
that the secondary use involves merely an untransformed duplication
of the original, the Court implied that the value generated is little or
nothing more than the value inherent in the original. 12° The Court
recognized that parody, on the other hand, does add to the original
by providing the social benefit of shedding light on an earlier work
and in the process, creating a new one.'" The Camp bell Court reasoned
that the more transformative the new work is, the less significant the
"I See id. al 572-75.
" 2 See id. at 573.
113 See id, at 573-74,
" 1 14. at 574, 578-94.
115 See 17 U.S,C. § 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-81.
116 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-85.
117 See id. at 584-85. Previously, commerciality was given hard presumptive significance. See,
e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-49.
1
' 8 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85.
He See id. at 579; see also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3ti 913,923 (2d
Cir. 1994).
120 see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; accord American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 923.
121
 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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other factors that may weigh against fair use will be, such as commer-
cialism. 122
The Court stated that inherent in this first factor analysis is a
threshold inquiry of whether the secondary work is a parody for sec-
tion 107 purposes, thus deserving a fair use analysis. 123
 The Court
reasoned that if the secondary work has no critical bearing on the
substance or style of the original, the claim to a fair use defense
diminishes accordingly, and may even vanish, allowing other factors,
such as commerciality, to assume greater importance. 124 The Court's
test for whether parody exists is whether a reasonable person would
perceive the character as parodic.' 25
 In addition, the Court stated that
the relative had or good faith of the alleged infringer is not determi-
native of fair use. 126
 The Court reasoned that because parodists will
seldom get permission from those whose works they are parodying,
lack of permission to use a work does not weigh against a finding of
fair use.' 27
 The Court applied this new analysis to the facts at bar and
decided that while they might not assign a high rank to the parodic
element of the rap song, the work could still reasonably be perceived
as commenting on the original or criticizing it, thus warranting a full
analysis of the fair use delense.' 28
The Court next analyzed the second statutory factor, the nature
of the original, which draws its origin from the concept that some
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others.' 2• The Court implied that in general, the more factual the
original, the less protection it is entitled.'" The Court reasoned that
because parodies, however, almost always copy creative, original works,
this second factor analysis becomes nothing more than a tautology,
invariably weighing in favor of the original artist."' The Court agreed
with both lower courts that Orbison's original, creative expression falls
within the core of the copyright law's protective purposes.' 32
122 See id.
I" See id. at 582; see also Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Stipp. 826, 830
1990); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F. Stipp. 351, 357
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
'7olpbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
12" Nee id. at 582.
126 Nee id. at 585 n.18; Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436-37.
127 See. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18; Fisher, 794 F.2r1 in 437.
128 Sre Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
12,-, See id. at 586; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
13" See CaMPIVII, 510 U.S. at 586; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. See generally Feist Publications, Inc.
v, Rural ]'ele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1091) (facts not copyrightable).
131 SeP Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
122 See. id.
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The Court proceeded to look at the third statutory factor, the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
whole.' 33 In analyzing this third factor, the Supreme Court noted that
the test is whether the parodist appropriated a greater amount of the
original work than was necessary to "conjure up" an image of the
original in order to make the object of the parody's critical wit recog-
nizable.'" The Court reasoned that this "recognition" test creates a
plateau at which the parodist knows that his quotation of the original's
most distinctive features will be identified by the audience.' 35 Once the
parodist takes enough to assure identification, anything taken beyond
this is only reasonable to the extent of the parody's overriding purpose
and character or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve
as a market substitute for the original.''° The Court reasoned that 2
Live Crew had not appropriated too much, for if they had copied a
less memorable part of the original, it would be difficult to see how its
parodic character would shine through. 137
Last, the Campbell Court re-analyzed the fourth factor, the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work)" This was characterized as the most important fair use factor
until Campbell, whereas the Supreme Court conspicuously omitted this
phrasing)" Abandoning the idea that any factor enjoys primacy, the
Supreme Court in Campbell dictated that all four factors are to be
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."" The Court
noted that this analysis requires the court to consider both the actual
market harm caused by the infringement as well as the potential market
usurpation for derivative works."'
In a situation involving something beyond pure duplication for
commercial purposes, the Court stated that there is no presumption
or inference of market harm." 2 The Court noted that this is so because,
whereas pure duplication of a product supersedes the original and
serves as a market replacement for it, a transformative use makes
133 See id.
131 Id. at 588; see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,757 (9th Cir. 1978).
I" Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588; accord Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544-45.
I " See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
' 57 See id. at 588-89.
15' See id. at 590-94.
159 See id. at 590-93; American Geophysical Union, 60 F, 3d at 926.
14" See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3c1 at 926.
141 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. Evidence of substantial harm weighs against a finding of
fair use because the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation
of originals. See id. at 593.
112 See id. at 591.
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market substitution less certain.'" In parody, the Court reasoned, it is
more likely that the new work will not affect the market for the original
because the parody and the original usually serve different market
functions."' Also, the Court noted that a parody will tend not to affect
the potential market for derivative works because it is unlikely that
creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons
of their product.'" The Court reasoned that in the case at bar there
was no evidence that a potential rap market was harmed by 2 Live
Crew's version.'" In sum, the Supreme Court concluded that it was
error for the Court of Appeals to find that the commercial nature of
2 Live Crew's parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" rendered it presumptively
unfair, and thus held that the rap parody was fair use of the protected
original.'"
111. CARTOON CASES AND FAIR USE
In 1924, in King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a toy manufacturer's
exact reproduction of a syndicated cartoon character constituted an
illegal infringement.'" King Features Syndicate ("King") owned exclu-
sive rights to the cartoon strip "Barney Google," including the right to
reproduce the characters.'" Fleischer was a toy manufacturer who
produced a toy horse fashioned after, labeled and sold as Barney
Google's horse, "Sparky."' 5°
The trial court denied King's motion for a preliminary injunction
and instead granted Fleischer's motion to dismiss the suit.' 51 The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Fleischer could
not avoid infringement by taking the substance or idea and producing
"3 See id.
144 Seee, id. Compare Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438 (holding that parody song "When Sonny Sniffs
Glue" was not commercial substitute for When Sunny Gets Blue," because consumers desirous
of hearing romantic and .
 nostalgic ballad would not be satisfied by purchasing parody instead)
with Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Stipp. at 1208 & n.14 (finding market harm in restaurant commercial
parody of "Be a Pepper" campaign because plaintiff spent $100 million on campaign, and
defendant's parody could potentially distract from its uniqueness and originality, thus shortening
life of campaign and causing loss of business and goodwill plaintiff' had built up).
145
 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
146 See id. at 593.
147 See id. at 594.
' 48 299 F. 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1924) (decided under the Copyright Act of 1909); see also Fleischer
Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc. 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934) (concluding that doll
manufacturer's reproduction of "Betty Boop" cartoon was infringement).
149 See King Fealure,s, 299 F. at 534.
150 See id.
151 See id.
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it through a different medium.' 52 The court stated that, by doing this,
Fleischer was not acting as an artisan himself, but merely as someone
who appropriated the intellect and creativity of the original artist.'"
The court then stated that the copyright owner is entitled to any use
of his property for financial gain. 154 The court noted that by securing
a monopoly to the owner, the copyright laws protect the commercial
value of the property while simultaneously encouraging the develop-
ment of the arts.' 55
 The court reasoned that Fleischer's toy doll, manu-
factured in the exact image of King's protected cartoon, appropriated
all of the cartoonist's intellectual and creative product. 156 The copyright
laws, noted the court, were designed to protect the creation of such a
product.'•4
 The Second Circuit held that Fleischer had infringed King's
copyrighted product by manufacturing a toy doll that usurped the
commercial value of the original character, and thus determined that
the appropriation was not fair use. 35"
In 1978, in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a comic book com-
pany's copying of over seventeen copyrighted cartoon characters did
not constitute fair use because the extent of the defendant's appropria-
tion from the original exceeded permissible levels.'" Air Pirates was an
underground comic book that had transformed several well-known
Disney cartoon characters into active members of a free thinking,
promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.m The court began its
discussion by noting that comic strip characters are protectable under
copyright.'"' The court then focused on the amount and substantiality
of the appropriation of the Disney charactets,'" 2
 In evaluating how
much of a taking was necessary to recall or conjure up the original,
the court first recognized that given the widespread public recognition
of the Disney characters, very little appropriation would be necessary
to place Mickey and his image in reader's minds.'" The court also
152 See id. at 535.
155 See id.
154 See King Features, 299 F. at 536.
1 " See id.
156 See id. at 538.
167 See id. at 537.
158 See id. at 538.
"581 F.2d 751,753,758 (9th Cir. 1978). This case was decided under the Copyright Act of
1909. See. Wall Disney, 581 F.2d at 759.
"See id. at 753.
161 See id. at 754-55.
I N See id. at 756-58.
1611 See id. at 757-58.
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reasoned that because the medium involved is a graphic work rather
than a purely textual one, recognizable caricature that conjures up the
image of the original in the reader's minds does not require excessive
copying. 1 " The court also found it significant that the essence of the
parody did not focus on how the characters looked, but instead focused
on their personalities, wholesomeness and innocence.' 65 The court
stated that the desire to copy substantially in order to make the "best
parody" needs to be balanced against the rights of the owner in his or
her original expressions, and concluded that excessive copying will be
allowed only if there exists a "special need for accuracy."' 66 The court
found that in the case at bar, Air Pirates had copied the Disney char-
acters in their entirety, thereby taking more than was necessary to
conjure up the famous characters in readers' minds. ]67
 The Ninth
Circuit thus held that such excessive copying precluded a claim of fair
use.'
In 1981, in Pillsbury v. Milky Way Productions, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that a humor
magazine's publication of a picture resembling copyrighted trade char-
acters constituted fair use."'" Milky Way, publishers of Screw magazine,
published a picture of plaintiff's trademark and two stanza jingle ("The
Pillsbury Baking Song") along with figures resembling plaintiff's trade
characters Poppin' Fresh and Poppie Fresh engaged in sexual inter-
course and fellatio. 17° After establishing that Pillsbury had established
a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the court then analyzed
the validity of the defendant's affirmative defense of fair use."' In its
finding that defendant's work constituted fair use of plaintiff's pro-
tected copyrights, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia performed an analysis of all four statutory factors. 172
161 See Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 758.
165 ,tire id. The court stated in dicta that defendants' copying may have been justified if:
they had paralleled closely (with a few significant twists) Disney characters and their
actions in a manner that conjured tip the particular elements of the innocence of
the characters that were to he satirized. While greater license may be necessary
under those circumstances, here the copying of the graphic image appears to have
no other purpose than to track Disney's work as a whole as closely as possible.
Id. UnfOrtunately, the court did nut give any examples to help explain what this cryptic language
actually means. See id.
166 See id.
157 See id.
168
 See id.
16'1 8 Media L. Rep. (LINA) 1016, 1024 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
' 71)
 See id. at 1016-17.
I/I See hi. at 1020-21.
172 Id. at 1021-24.
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The court found that the effect of the appropriation on market
value weighed in favor of Milky Way, stating that Pillsbury failed to
introduce any substantive evidence supporting its claim of economic
harm, and the court would not automatically presume economic injury
merely because of the commercial nature of both works.'" The court
next focused on the purpose and character of the use, again finding
in favor of Milky Way by concluding that the parody was more of an
editorial or social commentary on the values epitomized by the char-
acters than an attempt to capitalize financially on the original work. 174
In its analysis, the court noted that social commentary in a newspaper
or magazine is not put to a commercial use simply because one sells a
newspaper rather than gives it to the public free of charge.'" As to the
nature of the copyrighted work, the court found in favor of infringe-
ment because the original works were imaginative elements responsi-
ble for consumer recognition.'" Finally, the court analyzed the amount
and substantiality of the use, and again found in favor of infringement,
stating that Milky Way used more of the copyrighted works than was
necessary to suggest the original to its readers.'" The court noted that
in our media-saturated society, it would be difficult to find anyone of
television age who would not recognize the famous doughboy and
jingle.'" The court reasoned that although it is difficult to estimate the
extent that the plaintiffs work would have to be copied to remind
viewers of the original, given its widespread recognition, it would cer-
tainly be less than the amount borrowed. 17" In its totality analysis, the
court indicated that Milky Way's excessive appropriation did not fore-
close the fair use defense because a court must consider all four factors
together, with special emphasis on the effect of the copying upon the
potential market for the protected work.m" In the end, the Pillsbury
court held that Milky Way's appropriation constituted fair use because
Pillsbury failed to show any appreciable harm to the potential market
for, or the value of, its copyrighted works and because Milky Way lacked
any intent to fill the demand for the original. 18 '
173 See id. at 1022.
174
 See Pillsbury, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1022.
175 See id. The court also noted that the Copyright Act does not exclude pornographic
materials front the parameters of the fair use defense. See id.
176 See id. at 1023.
177
 See id.
176
 See N.
175 See Pillsbury, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1023.
186 See id.
181 See id. at 1023-24. The court noted that it did not condone the manner in which
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In 1987, however, in Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that a movie poster's copying of Steinberg's cartoon was not a
parody and therefore not entitled to the protection of the fair use
affirmative defense. 182 Steinberg is an artist famous for his cartoons in
the New Yorker magazine.'" Columbia Pictures Industries used Stein-
berg's "New Yorker View of the World" cartoon to design its promo-
tional poster for the movie "Moscow on the Hudson. "184
 In analyzing
the first statutory factor, the purpose and character of the use, the
court stated that Columbia did not design either the movie or the
poster to be a parody of Steinberg's cartoon.'" The court determined
that the poster merely borrowed numerous elements of Steinberg's
cartoon to create an advertisement to promote an unrelated commer-
cial product.'" The court refused to allow a fair use defense, reasoning
that Columbia's variation on the visual joke of Steinberg's cartoon did
not, without an element of humor aimed at some aspect of the illus-
tration itself, render it a parody under section 107 entitled to the
affirmative defense.' 81 The court thus held that Columbia's copying of
Steinberg's cartoon was not fair use, and, therefore, it constituted an
actionable copyright infringement's'
In 1993, in United Feature Syndicate, Inc., v. Koons, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York again re-
fused to apply a fair use analysis to the appropriation of a cartoon
character because it concluded that a sculpture modeled after a copy-
righted cartoon character was not a section 107 parody entitled to a
fair use defense. 189
 Koons used United Feature Syndicate's
("United Feature") cartoon character Odie from the Garfield strip as a
model for a theme exhibition on "banaIity."190 The only difference
between the three-dimensional sculpture and the two dimensional
defendant chose to "assault the corporate citadel, but value judgments have no place in [the
analysis]." Id.
182
 663 F. Supp. 706, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
1" See id. at 708.
1" See id. at 708-10.
1" See id. at 715.
I"" See id.
1"7
	 Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 714. The court noted that the other fair use factors did
nothing to mitigate their determination: the work at issue was an artistic creation, a very substan-
tial portion of which was copied, and the value of Steinberg's reputation was injured by having
the public believe that he lent his work to a profit-making enterprise. See id. at 715.
1 " See id.
I " 817 F. Supp. 370, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
1911 Id. at 372-73.
December 19961	 CARTOONS & FAIR USE PROTECTION	 165
character, besides relative size, was a slightly longer tongue on Koon's
piece.'"'
The court determined that the sculpture did not qualify as a
section 107 parody entitled to the fair use defense because it was, at
best, a parody of society at large rather than a parody of Odie.'" 2 The
court maintained that a section 107 parody entitled to the defense
must at least in part comment upon the copied work, and Koons
admitted that he could have used other images or figures besides Odie
to make his point.'" In light of this admission, the court stated that it
became even more obvious that his sculpture was not a comment,
criticism, or parody directed at Odic.'" Thus, there was no justification
for the fair use defense.'"
The court applied an analysis of all four statutory factors to show
that, even assuming that Koons's sculpture was a section 107 parody,
it would still fail the analysis for a fair use defense.'" As to the purpose
and character of the use, the court found that the use had a commer-
cial nature because Koons sold two copies of the sculpture for $125,000
each, and thus clearly had an intent to make a profit.'" 7 The court
noted that the mere fact that an infringing copy can be classified as
art does not necessarily afford the copier a valid fair use defense. 198
In analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work, the court rebuffed
Koons's argument that the popularity and commercial success of the
Garfield  characters transformed them into the public domain, thereby
resulting in a loss of copyright protection.' 9" The court noted that these
imaginative characters did not lose copyright protection as a result of
their incorporation into American culture. 20° In analyzing the amount
and substantiality of the portion used, the court found that Koons's
sculpture copied Odie virtually in its entirety, thus exceeding a permis-
sible level of use.20 ' Finally, as to the potential effect on the market, the
court suggested that if the unauthorized use of Odie became wide-
spread, it would prejudice United Feature's potential licensing market
not only in three-dimensional representations, but also in posters,
191 See id. at 373.
192 See id. at 383-84.
193 See id.
194 See United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 384.
195 See id.
196 See id. at 378-82.
191 See id. at 379.
1)$ See id.
199 See United Feature, 817 F'. Supp. at 380.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 381.
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cards, T-shirts, calendars and other derivative works.'" This analysis was
only dicta, however, insofar as the court ultimately held that Koons's
sculpture of United Feature's protected cartoon character did not
warrant a fair use defense. 2°3
W. ANALYSIS
In the years before the Supreme Court decided Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., the general litigation surrounding the fair use defense
to parody had mixed results. 204 In situations involving almost in toto
appropriation of cartoon characters, however, fair use was denied in
all instances except one." 5 Yet, despite this precedent, one cartoonist's
appropriation in a comic strip of another cartoonist's protected char-
acters is in fact the exact sort of parody or satire that deserves exemp-
tion from liability under the fair use defense.
In our society, parody is a valued form of criticism, encouraged
because it fosters the creativity protected by the copyright laws." 6 In
every parody case involving cartoons, however, the court analyzing the
four fair use factors has found infringement—with the exception of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
in Pillsbury v. Milky Way Productions. 207 Although a cartoon crossover
on the newspaper comics pages (where one cartoon strip expressly uses
another's characters) has never been litigated, in light of this prece-
dent, all such crossovers would seem to infringe on protected territory,
and the offending cartoonists thus unknowingly put themselves at legal
risk," One would surmise, therefore, that both Berkeley Breathed and
Bill Griffith have opened themselves up to potential liability by using
20.2 See id. at 381-82.
200 See id. at 384.
204 Compare Fisher 794 F.2d at 434, 440 (concluding that "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," parody
of romantic song "When Sunny Gets Blue," was fair use), and Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding "1 Love Sodom" Saturday Night Live
skit parodying "I Love New York" ad campaign to be fair use), affd, 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.
1980), with Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1208 (finding restaurant commercial parody of "Be a
Pepper" campaign not fair use), and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 479 F. Supp. at 361 (musical revue
parody of "Gone with the Wind" found not to be fair use).
205 Compare Pillsbury, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1024 (fair use), with Walt Disney, 581 F.2d
at 758 (no fair use), and King Features, 299 F. at 538 (no fair use), and United Feature, 817 E
Supp. at 383-84 (no fair use), and Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 715 (no fair use).
206 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
207
	 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1024. Compare id., with Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 758, and
King Features, 299 F. at 538, and United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 384, and Steinberg 663 F. Supp.
at 715.
208 The legality of cartoon crossovers has never been discussed before, but the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has presented the possibility for such a
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protected characters in their strips. 2°9
 Even if a court would likely have
found copyright infringement in a crossover situation in the past, this
probability has changed with the Supreme Court's revision of the fair
use criteria in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., although that case did
not involve cartoons. 21)
In light of the Campbell Court's re-analysis of the fair use defense,
which provides the parodist with more legal rights, the two decisions
closest to a crossover situation—Walt Disney v. Air Pirates and Pillsbury
v. Milky Way Productions—must be reconciled. 2 " Post-Campbell, the
Pillsbury decision provides the correct analysis for crossovers; and as
the following discussion illustrates, cartoon crossovers, such as the
Outland and Zippy crossovers mentioned above, should indeed consti-
tute fair use.
The Court in Campbell paved a new road for the parodist. 212 Three
aspects of the decision allow much more latitude in copying a pro-
tected work than has been afforded in the past. 2 t 5
 First, the Court stated
that a commercial use does not create a presumption of unfair use.'"
This gives all parodies fair treatment with no initial presumptions
based on any actual or perceived commercial nature. Second, by not
explicitly stating, as it had in the past, that the fourth factor (effect on
the potential market) is the single most important element of fair use,
the Court apparently abandoned the idea that any one factor enjoys
primacy, instead implying that all four factors are to be weighed to-
gether equally. 215
 This re-analysis ensures that a court will perform a
full and fair analysis of a crossover, rather than find a presumption
against fair use simply because potential market harm exists. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the Court lowered the parody "thresh-
old" analysis, thus opening up the fair use defense to many more
situations by stating that "taking parodic aim at an original is a less
critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found
situation by noting that syndicated cartoon characters "can be the subject of a parody which is
protected by the Stir use doctrine." United Feature, 817 F. Stipp, at 380 11.5.
(J'J See IhmvrttEn, supra note 2, at 8-9; Griffith, supra note 13.
110 See 510 U.S. 569,578-94 (1994). This case involved 2-Live Crew's rap music parody of Roy
Orbison's Oh, Pretty Woman. See id. at 572.
In
 See id. at 578-94. Compare Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 758 (no Ihir use), with Pillsbury, 8
Media L Rep. (RNA) at 1017 (fair use).
211 See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-94.
213 Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85, with Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Mc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984).
214
 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85.
215
 See American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 926; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (fourth factor is niost important).
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to be fair use" if the other factors weigh in the parodist's favor. 216 In
the past, courts would sometimes deny outright the fair use defense by
stating that the alleged parody did not qualify as a section 107 parody
because there was not a sufficient element of humor aimed at the
original. 217 Post-Campbell, however, nearly all parodies should easily pass
this lowered threshold test and receive a full fair use analysis, rather
than being stopped at the gate by a determination that there is not a
sufficient element of humor aimed at some specific aspect of the
original.218
In a cartoon crossover situation, the prima facie case of infringe-
ment is easily established. Common law has long recognized that copy-
right protection is available for cartoon and comic strip characters. 21
Because all syndicated features are registered with the Copyright Of-
fice, ownership of the copyright in the cartoon character is thus easily
established. 22" Under the copyright statute, the certificate of registra-
tion constitutes evidence of ownership. 221 Next, copying of a protected
work is easily established by either (1) direct evidence; or (2) circum-
stantial evidence consisting of (a) access to the original (which can be
established by viewing the comics pages in our nation's newspapers)
and (b) substantial similarity (which can be established in that an exact
reproduction of another cartoonist's character would lead an ordinary
observer to equate the copy with the original). 222 In the Outland exam-
ple, direct evidence of unauthorized copying of protected characters
is available because Breathed explicitly refers to his reproductions by
name as Walt Disney, Mickey Mouse and the rest of the Disney charac-
ters."' Griffith's infringing use of other cartoonists' syndicated charac-
ters in the Zippy strip meets the circumstantial evidence test because
216 See Cam.-bei,p	 510 U.S. at 580-81 n.14.
217 See United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 383-84; Steinberg, 663 E Supp. at 714.
218 Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81 n.14, with Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 714 (holding
that defendant's Moscow oN THE HUDSON cartoon was not § 107 parody entitled to fair use
analysis since it did not have element of humor aimed at some aspect of plaintiff's "New Yorker
View of the World* illustration).
219 See, e.g., Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 754 (Mickey Mouse and other Disney characters); King
Features, '299 F. at 535 (Barney Google's horse Sparky); United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 376
(Garfield's doggie pal Odle). Copyright protection is unavailable for things such as facts or ideas.
See, e.g., Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 344.
220 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
See id.
222 See, e.g.,
& Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,1162 (9th Cir. 1977). Even
if one cartoonist uses another's character in a different plot, or portrays the character with an
altered personality, this still constitutes a "copy" for purposes of copyright infringement. See Walt
Disney, 581 F.2d at 754.
221 See MEAT/ IED, supra note 2, at 8-9.
Warner Bros., Inc., v. American Broad. Co., 654 F.2d '204,207 (2d Cir. 1981); Sid
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of the cartoonist's access to the protected characters, and the in toto
similarity and obvious reference to those other characters. 221 First,
access is established because the protected characters that Griffith used
can be seen on comics pages all across the country. This access is
similar to that in lluin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Interna-
tional, Ltd., where the Second Circuit held that the ability to watch
televised programs serves as the functional equivalent of access to the
protectable content of the teleplays. 225 Similarly, the ability to read the
comics pages also serves as the functional equivalent of access to the
protectible comic strip characters.221' Second, substantial similarity can
be established because an ordinary observer reading the Zippy strip
would no doubt recognize the protected characters in the same way
that the United Feature court held that an ordinary observer would
equate Odle with Koons's sculpture, which was a virtual reproduc-
tion of the cartoon dog in both appearance and expression. 227 In the
Zippy strip, Griffith's reproduction of the twelve protected characters
in both appearance and expression is similar to Koons's reproduction
of Odie.22g In sum, a cartoon crossover will always involve a copyright
infringement of a protected work even if no direct evidence is avail-
able, because an exact reproduction of a protected character is obvi-
ously a virtual copy of that character's appearance and expression, and
an ordinary observer should easily recognize this overwhelming simi-
larity.22"
In addition, because a cartoon crossover is essentially a recasting
of the protected cartoon character into an adaptation, this constitutes
an infringement of the original artist's protected rights to reproduce
and prepare derivative works of the original. 25" In the Outland example,
the unauthorized adaptation of protected characters is an obvious
transformation of the original because Breathed places protected char-
acters into an alternate cartoon reality. 231
 Similarly, Griffith's unauthor-
ized use of other cartoonists' syndicated characters is evident based on
the borrowing of twelve famous cartoon characters' heads for use in
the Zippy u n ive rse . 232
224 See Griffith, supra note 13.
226 See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1372.
226 See id.
227 See United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 378.
228 See id.
229 See id. at 377-78.
23° See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,106.
231 See BREATHED, supra note 2, at 8-9.
232 See Griffith, supra note 13.
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Thus, a cartoon crossover involves a copyright infringement
through the unauthorized copying of a protected original and its use
in a derivative work:233
 Yet, why are these cartoonists who appropriate
protected characters not subject to legal consequences? No court has
ever discussed industry custom and usage as an exemption from copy-
right infringement. 234
 The only way for the offending cartoonist to be
free from liability must lie in the affirmative defense of fair use. Apply-
ing a post- Campbell analysis to the Outland and Zippy examples dem-
onstrates how a court should work its way through all four statutory
factors to find fair use in cartoon crossover situations:235 The first factor
in the fair use analysis is the "threshold" inquiry of whether the car-
toons constitute a parody for section 107 purposes:236 Generally, the
courts look not at whether the parody was done in good taste or bad,
but whether the infringer uses some element of a prior author's com-
position to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author's work in addition to commenting on society, thus justifying the
borrowing.'" If the secondary work has no critical bearing on the
substance or style of the original, the claim to fairness in borrowing
from another's work diminishes accordingly, and may even vanish,
allowing other factors, such as commerciality, to assume greater impor-
tance.'" The policy behind requiring this threshold inquiry of whether
a parodic character can be recognized is that a work which makes some
critical comment about the original reflects the perspective of the
parodist, thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertain-
ment function.'" Without this requirement of social value, any comic
use of an existing work would be protected, removing the "fair" from
the term "fair use" and negating the underlying purpose of copyright
law—protecting original works from unfair exploitation. 240
233 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106,
234 In fact, the only case in which custom and usage was ever mentioned by a court was Dr.
Pepper Co. v. Samba's Restaurants, Inc., where the court noted that use of a competitor's product
for the purpose of advertising was generally accepted in the industry. 517 F. Stipp. at 1208.
235 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-94.
236
 See id. at 580-83.
237 See id.; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes,");
Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436; Walt Disney, 58i F.2d at 758 n.15; Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545. Otherwise, there
is no need to "conjure up" the original in the reader's mind and no justification for borrowing
from it. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436; Watt Disney, 581 F.2d at 758 n.15,
238 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580; see, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that substitution into copyrighted song while performing for commercial gain
constitutes musical plagiarism, not fair use); United Feature, 817 F. Stipp. at 384 (holding that
sculpture of "Oche" illustrating banality deserves no fair use defense because the sculptor admit-
ted that other images or figures could have been used instead).
2" See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 479 F. Stipp. at 357.
246 See id.
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Previously, courts had required a much higher showing of critical
commentary on the original to pass this threshold, but the Court in
Campbell lowered the test, allowing parodies that more loosely target
an original to be sufficiently aimed at an original work to fall within
the section 107 parody requirement and receive a full Fair use analy-
sis."' In light of the Campbell re-analysis, whether or not a court assigns
a high rank to the parodic element of the allegedly infringing work,
the threshold has been lowered to the point where all parodies should
qualify as section 107(1) parodies for purposes of analyzing a fair use
defense. 242 Nonetheless, in both the Outland and Zippy cartoons, the
reader can clearly perceive a parodic nature.'" Certainly, Breathed's
scathing depiction of the modern corporate structure as a power hun-
gry, money driven conglomerate includes the Disney Studio as part of
the critique. Likewise, Griffith's commentary on the proliferation of
corporate merger and how it will control the dissemination of infor-
mation directly implicates Disney—the company that just bought the
American Broadcasting Company, a major television newtwork. Thus,
these two cartoons not only comment on modern corporate society in
general, but also specifically target Disney as the epitome of modern
corporate values."' Therefore, the "threshold" inquiry of whether the
use constitutes parody is easily passed because the Supreme Court in
Campbell allowed a great degree of latitude in finding parodic con-
tent. 2"
Even if these were two situations where a reader could not perceive
any commentary on the original, Campbell dictates that the cartoonist
could still claim the fair use defense."' For example, one could argue
that the very fact that Griffith uses twelve different cartoon characters
rather than just one is similar to United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons,
where Koons admitted that he could have used other images in his
sculpture besides Odle, and thus the court rejected the fair use defense
241 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81 n.14.
242 See id. at 580-81 n.14, 582-83. Previously, courts were more willing to deprive a parody
the fair use analysis by claiming that the threshold was not passed. See MCA, 677 F.2c1 at 185
(concluding that song spoof in nude cabaret show falls short of "parody" for § 107 purposes);
Metro
-Goldwyn -Mayer, 479 F. Supp. at 357 (finding that cabaret song and dance spoof of GONE
wrrtt 'FILE WIND is not eligible for fitir use protection because it does not comment on the movie
but only achieves pure comic effect); see also DC Comics, Inc., v, Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc.,
598 F. Supp. 110, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (finding that singing telegram spoofs of Superman and
Wonderwoman arc mere adaptations sold on strengths of plaintifFs imagination and originality,
not parodies that create genuinely distinct product deserving litir use protection).
243 Sae Ca Mp bf (4 510 U.S. at 582-83.
244 See id.; With Disney, 581 F.2c1 at 758 n.15.
245 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 ("We have less difficulty in finding that critical [parodic]
element in 2 Live Crew's song than the Court of Appeals did 	 .").
2 '16 See id. at 580-81 & n.14.
172	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 38:145
as a matter of law. 247 If the Koons interpretation of fair use was still
applicable, then a reader could interpret Griffith's parody of newspa-
per comics competing for ever-narrowing readership not as a critique
of any of the actual characters he copies, but rather a parody of the
comic industry as a whole, thus subjecting him to infringement.'"
Campbell, however, lowers the "threshold" inquiry to the extent that
even if the commentary has no critical bearing on the original, the
lack of criticism only diminishes, and does not extinguish, the right to
claim fair use as a defense. 249
 Instead, the other statutory factors assume
greater importance in the court's balancing test."' Thus, even if a
reader perceives no parodic content of the original in Breathed or
Griffith's work, rather than denying a fair use defense, a court would
instead more closely scrutinize the remaining factors."'
As such, the next step would be to continue a full first factor analy-
sis of the purpose and character of the use. 252
 Breathed and Griffith's
use of protected characters is not intended for commercial purposes,
but for social commentary. Newspapers purchase comic strips such as
Outland and Zippy not on the strength of their periodic use of pro-
tected characters, but because of the quality of the strips themselves.
Therefore, using protected characters for crossovers brings in no ad-
ditional financial reward for the cartoonists and is similar to Pillsbury,
where the court stated that the parody of Poppin' Fresh was more in
the nature of an editorial or social commentary on the values epito-
mized by the characters than an attempt to capitalize financially on the
original work.'" As the Pillsbury court stated, social commentary in a
newspaper is not a commercial use simply because the publication is
sold rather than given to the public."'
Additionally, the Supreme Court's indication that a more transfor-
illative use (i.e., where the new work adds something new, altering
the original with a new expression, meaning or message) makes the
other statutory factors less significant bodes well for cartoonists.'" Both
Breathed and Griffith's works altered the originals in expression and
meaning by engaging "innocent" characters in a contemporary corpo-
247 ,See United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 384; Griffith, supra note 13.
2re See United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 384; Griffith, supra note 13.
219
 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
2r"
	 id. at 580-81 & n,14.
See id.
292 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-85.
2" See Pillsbury, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1021-22.
254 See id. at 1022.
255 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579,
December 1996]	 CARTOONS & FAIR USE PROM:C:170N 	 173
rate plot and issuing a message on the inherent dangers of big business
values.256 Because parody fosters the creativity and social value inherent
in a scathing commentary on society's problems, and because both of
the works in question involve very transformative uses, the first factor
analysis weighs in favor of the parodists getting a fair use defense. 257
The second factor (the nature of the copyrighted work), however,
weighs in favor of copyright infringement almost as a matter of law. 258
The copyright laws provide an infringer much less latitude in copying
fictional works than factual ones. 259 One factor to consider is whether
the original is creative, imaginative, or represents an investment of
time in anticipation of a financial return.2"0 In the two examples above,
the copied characters are syndicated cartoon strips that certainly fit
this category: they are unique characters designed by creative individu-
als for use on the comics page or in the movies, whereby they will
generate a financial return for the artist. As such, the nature of the
original in any crossover will be a creative, publicly known work heavily
protected by copyright. 26 ' Thus, because cartoon characters are creative
and imaginative works deserving wide copyright protection, this sec-
ond factor analysis is nothing more than a tautology that can almost
be eliminated from the fair use analysis because the owner of the
original is invariably guaranteed protection for the creative works. 262
The third factor, which concerns amount and substantiality used,
also weighs in favor of copyright infringement in a crossover situation.
Within this inquiry, courts focus on what else the parodist did besides
going to the heart of the origina1.253 Thus, if little is added or changed,
a court could arguably find the parody to be a superseding use that
substitutes for the original rather than a unique work entitled to fair
use.264 But because a parody's humor and comment derive from dis-
torted imitation of a known original, it follows that the parodic work
must consist primarily of the original. 265
In determining the amount of taking necessary to the parodic
work, the courts evaluate the pervasiveness of public recognition of the
936 See BREATHED, supra note 2, at 8-9; Griffith, supra note 13.
257 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
253 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
259
 See generally Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 344 (facts not copyrightable).
2m See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
261 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
262 See United Feature, 817 F. Stipp. at 380.
253 See Campbeg 510 U.S. at 588-89 (noting that heart of song is what most readily conjures
tip song for parody, and it is heart at which parody takes aim).
254 See id.
265 See id.
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original to determine how much appropriation is required to conjure
it up in the minds of the readers. 266
 In general, however, using some
characteristic features cannot be avoided. 267
 Although quantity is im-
portant, this inquiry focuses primarily on the quality of how much of
the original work is used in relation to the purpose of its use. 268 In other
words, what matters is whether the parodist copied more than neces-
sary in order for the reader to recognize the original:269 In our Disney
saturated society, Breathed's verbatim copying of Mickey and his pals
certainly goes beyond any minimum level of "conjuring up" necessary
for readers to identify these characters:270
 One could reason, as did the
court in Pillsbury, that the extent the Disney characters would have to
be copied to remind viewers of the originals is difficult to estimate, but,
given their widespread recognition, it would certainly be less than what
was borrowed. 271
 For example, rather than actually using the Disney
Studio and its famous characters in his critique, Breathed could have
created a generic animation studio that hinted at Disney:272 Mortimer
Mouse, with his red drawers with yellow buttons and shoes, conjures
up the identity of Disney without having to use Mickey, Snow White,
and the rest. Griffith's work comes closer to what may be a more
acceptable level of copying. 279 He uses only the heads of protected
characters, and on these he places mouse ears, thus implying, rather
than explicitly stating, that it is Disney that is the focus of the commen-
tary. 274
Most courts generally afford parody significant leeway with respect
to the extent and nature of their copying:275
 But in a situation of near
verbatim copying, the third factor inquiring into the amount and
substantiality of the use may, as a matter of law, be resolved against the
parodist. 276
 Because the Court in Campbell indicated that fair use is a
case by case analysis, however, it left open a window where almost
260 See id.; 1Volt Disney, 581 F.2d at 757 (noting that Disney characters are so well known that
very little is necessary to place Mickey Mouse in minds of readers).
267
 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
268 See id. at 586-87 (the extent of permissible copying 'varies with the purpose and character
of the use); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311.
26'5
	 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311 (what is relevant is the amount
and substantiality of the copyrighted expression used, not the factual content of the material in the
copyrighted piece).
27" See BREATHED, supra note 2, at 8-9.
271
 See 8 Media L. Rep. (RNA) at 1023.
2 72 See BREATHED, supra note 2, in 8-9.
273 See Griffith, supra note 13.
271 See id.
275 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
276 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589. Previously, near verbatim copying was a threshold test
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wholesale copying may be permitted in some situations, depending on
the analysis of the other statutory factors.'" Thus, even if the crossover
borrows an unacceptable amount from the original, this does not end
the inquiry but rather confirms that all four fair use factors must be
weighed together. 278
The final, but no longer primary, factor to be considered is the
effect of the borrowing on the market value of the original. 27" Similarity
of medium (play, book, movie, etc.) is not relevant to this analysis.'"
Also, in assessing this factor, the parody's critical impact is ignored.28'
"Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics. . . Biting criticism
suppresses demand; copyright infringement usurps I t. "282 Thus, the
concern with market replacement is not whether a "bad review" by the
secondary work causes the market to diminish because of its critical
nature, but whether the secondary work fulfills demand for the origi-
nal, either in whole or in part.'"
This determination involves a comparison of the function of the
two works. 284 If the function of both works is to entertain, the analysis
then focuses on the appeal of the derivative work. 2" For example, the
analysis of a musical parody would consider whether people listen to
the secondary work solely for its musical appeal, in which case the
defendant's right to appropriate is stronger, or whether people listen
to the secondary work purely because of its comic effect, in which case
the plaintiff is afforded more protection.
In assessing the actual market harm as well as the potential market
usurpation for derivative works, crossovers seem to have little or no
effect. It is true that both the original and the crossover attempt to
entertain through graphic cartoon humor. Arguably, the same people
who read the strips containing the crossovers are also familiar with the
original strips since many perusers of the comics page read the major-
ity of strips offered. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Breathed or
Griffith's work will usurp the other cartoons' readers or newspaper
whereby the parody was eliminated entirely from lair use protection. See Wilt Disney, 581 F.2d at
757; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 479 F. Supp. at 358-59.
277
 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
278 See N. at 578; Pillsbury, 8 Media 1_ Rep. (BNA) at 1023.
278 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
281) See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (RNA)
2190, 2192 (N.D. Ga, 1981).
281 See Fisher; 794 F.2d at 437.
282 1r1. at 437-38.
283 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-92; Fisher; 794 F.2d at 438.
28 '1 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591; Metro-Goltluyn -Mayer, 479 F. Stipp. at 301.
288 See Campbell 510 U.S. at 591-92; Metw-Golduryit-Mayer, 479 F. Supp. at 301.
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space. On the contrary, because the parody gives these strips "free
press," readership may actually increase.
Newspapers buy, and people read, Outland and Zippy because of
the unique appeal of these strips. If newspapers choose not to buy, or
if people choose not to read, Garfield, Family Circus, or any other strip
used by Griffith or Breathed, it is likely not because Berkeley Breathed
or Bill Griffith creates a substitute for those strips, but because cartoon
fans do not like those strips. Certainly, a Disney parody will not take
away from anyone going to see Disney movies. The children who go to
see Pocahontas do not make up the readership of Outland. Likewise,
the parents who do make up this readership are not going to tell a
small child "No, we can't go see Aladdin. But, hey, here's the Sunday
comics."
As far as derivative works go, unlike the situation where Koons
sold his Odie statues for $1 25,000 each, thus prejudicing the potential
merchandising market for the syndicate, use of protected characters
in a comic strip crossover will have no such effect. 2" First, crossovers
involve no sale. Second, whereas United Feature Syndicate may one
day decide to grant a license to a sculptor to produce Odie statues, no
syndicate or movie studio will ever grant a license allowing another
cartoonist to critically review or lampoon their product. 287 Finally, the
potential for market substitution decreases with an increase in the
amount of transformative use. 288 Thus, in a crossover situation, because
the "transformativeness" of the appropriated character is so high, a
presumption against market harm is effectively created.
V. CONCLUSION
After all four factors are analyzed, a cartoon crossover results in a
successful fair use defense. Even though factors two and three (the
nature of the copyrighted work and the amount and substantiality of
the portion used) will almost always weigh in favor of infringement,
the first and fourth factors (purpose and character of the use and the
effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work) must weigh
more heavily in favor of the fair use defense where comic strip cross-
overs are concerned. 2" This is so for three reasons. First of all, in such
situations, the parodist's intent is for social critique or commentary,
not to fill the demand for the original. Second, crossovers do not usurp
2" See United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 379.
287 See Campbell 510 U.S. at 592; United Feature, 817 F. Supp. at 382.
288 See Campbell. 510 U.S. at 591.
288 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-94.
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the value of the original product in either the actual existing market
or in the potential derivative market for merchandising. Finally, the
purpose of parody is criticism, which is valued because it Fosters crea-
tivity while showing us our foibles as a society. As such, it promotes the
purpose behind copyright law by encouraging commentary and crea-
tivity.m This policy behind copyright protection, combined with the
Supreme Court's re-analysis of the fair use factors in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., should thus allow a cartoonist to appropriate another
cartoonist's protected characters for crossover use in a cartoon strip. 29 '
Post- Campbell, social commentary on the comics page is the sort of
parody that is to be accorded a successful fair use defense.
DAVID LONDON
290 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; MCA, 677 F.2t1 at 183; Pillsbury, 8 Media L. Rep. (RNA) at
10'23.
29L See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-94.
